Expectations for
the Jordanian Economy
Under the Rule of His Majesty
King Abdullah ||
An article prepared and submitted
to the Journal
"Arab Bank Review"
August, 1999
Introduction
Growth, external public debt, poverty,
unemployment, chronic trade balance
deficit, and some other economic
structural distortions are all major
difficulties and challenges that the
Jordanian economy is now facing.
The succession of the late King Hussein
by his son King Abdullah || comes at a
very critical turn-point in the history of
the Jordanian economy. This raises many
conjectures and speculations concerning
the future performance of the Jordanian
economy under the new regime. The scope of
expectations regarding the ability of the
Jordanian economy to overcome the
significant problems it faces varies
widely. However, it is imperative to first
evaluate the general characteristics and
current conditions of the Jordanian
economy, touch on the main features of the
economic structural re-adjustment program,
and examine the nature of challenges and
difficulties Jordan faces before making
any gestures concerning its ability to
meet with such challenges.
An Overview of the Jordanian Economy:
Jordan is a small country of a 4.5
million people comprising a dedicated and
highly skilled labor force of 1.2 million.
The economy suffers from scarce financial
and natural resources, and is dominated by
trade and services-related activities,
which account for more than two-thirds of
GDP, manufacturing, agriculture, mining
and construction activities account for
the remaining third.
The current structure of the Jordanian
economy exhibits the same traditional
features of a small open economy, which
makes it extremely vulnerable to regional
as well as international pressures. Due to
the geopolitical positioning of Jordan
within the center of regional
transformations, the current state of the
Jordanian economy can be conceived as a
fair reflection of developments in the
economies of other countries within the
region.
In this regard, Jordan's high
dependence on capital inflows,
international financial assistance and
workers' remittances has made the economy
highly vulnerable to external factors.
Aided by discrete and prudent
administration of its political
leadership, Jordan has been successfully
able to capitalize on its geographical
location and the warm relations it enjoys
with most of its neighbors as well as
other countries of the world.
Four main development stages can be
distinguished when studying Jordan's
modern economic history extending form the
year 1973 until present. These stages can
be outlines as follows:
The Period from 1973-1982:
This period was marked by high and
unprecedented economic growth, which was
boosted by sizeable external financial
assistance, huge influx of workers'
remittances and increased exportation.
Vast amounts of funds were heavily
invested in infrastructure projects and
housing.
The Gulf States provided extensive job
opportunities for Jordanians, and
presented highly consuming markets for
Jordanian agriculture and industrial
products as well. Economic growth, during
this period, stood at an average of 24.5%
in nominal terms and 11.6% in real terms.
However, high spending, growing
importation and expanding aggregate demand
induced inflationary pressures and
widening trade deficit, which was financed
by a notable surplus in capital account.
The Period from 1983-1989:
Being highly vulnerable to external
factors, the sharp drop in oil prices
during mid 1980s and the resulting
retraction in the economies of the
Gulf States
have had severe repercussions on the
Jordanian economy. The contractionary
policies adopted by the Gulf States in the
aftermath of the decline in oil prices and
the subsequent slowdown in their economies
have negatively affected Jordan's trade
with these countries and the inflow of
expatriate remittances and financial aid.
On the macro-level, real economic
growth slipped form an average of 11.6%
annually during the period 1973/82 to an
annual average of 2.2% during this period,
indicating a sharp fall in per capita
share of GDP. Towards the end of this
stage, the deficit in the general budget
up-surged to a very high level of 25% of
GDP, which triggered excessive government
borrowing, both domestically and
internationally. Ultimately, Jordan's
total outstanding external debt climbed up
to more than 190% of GDP.
The government could not continue to
borrow for so long due to weakening credit
worthiness, and the amounting deficits in
trade balance and balance of payments have
eventually led to the depletion of the
Central Bank's foreign reserves and,
subsequently, the devaluation of the
Jordanian Dinar in 1988.
The Period from 1989-1995:
During early current decade and in the
aftermath of the 1988 financial crisis and
the subsequent close collapse of its
economy,
Jordan found no other alternative but to
re-examine its economic performance and
pinpoint elements of weaknesses as a
prerequisite towards the alleviation of
structural imbalances in its economy.
This period witnessed the embarking on
of the first economic structural
re-adjustment program initiated with the
help of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) aiming
at finding effective remedies to end
economic suffering and external
imbalances. However, this program was
suspended in the aftermath of the second
Gulf War and the destructive effects it
had brought about to the Jordanian
economy. In 1992, the difficult journey of
economic re-adjustment was resumed again,
and a new economic re-adjustment program
with ambitious targets, aiming at
restoring internal and external balances,
was launched to cover the period 1992/98.
During this period, many successful
structural economic and legislative
adjustments were undertaken, and the
economy started to favorably respond to
these adjustments. Aided by the expansion
in aggregate demand and consumption,
aroused by a huge number of Jordanian
returnees from the Gulf States, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average
of 3.6% and 11.3% in real and nominal
terms respectively during the period
1989/95.
The Period from 1996-1998:
The outstanding performance of the
Jordanian economy during the previous
stage has initiated the government and the
International Monetary Fund to review and
reconsider economic targets stipulated for
the last three years of the original
economic readjustment program (1992/98).
The most important among the new targets
was to achieve a total GDP real growth of
20% over three years.
This period was characterize by the
application of tight monetary and fiscal
policies aiming at curbing inflation and
maintaining stability of the Jordanian
Dinar, in addition to restoring internal
as well as external balances. A high
interest rate policy was prudently used by
the monetary authorities in order to
suppress consumption, encourage domestic
savings and investments and enhance
savers' attractiveness to assets
denominated in Jordanian Dianr.
Constrained by regional tensions, the
partial loss of the Iraqi market, the
crash in oil prices, the relapse of the
peace process and the dominance of a
climate of uncertainty and vague
expectations, a state of deep economic
recession dominated. These factors,
together with the heavy debt burden, added
to the fiscal deficit and negatively
affected the balance of payments.
Accordingly, the pace of local and
foreign investments slowed down, and real
economic growth fell substantially below
target to 1% in 1996, 1.3% in 1997 and an
official figure of 2.2% in 1998, which may
well fall short to a flat level according
to some estimates.
The following table shows the wide
fluctuations in the performance of the
Jordanian economy over the period from
1976-1998:
|
|
Real GDP
Growth |
Inflation
Rate |
Investment
/GDP |
Fiscal Deficit
/GDP |
Current a/c
/GDP |
|
1976/80 |
9.5% |
11.7% |
35% |
-29.0% |
0.2% |
|
1981/85 |
6.2% |
5.4% |
31% |
-18.5% |
-5.2% |
|
1986/90 |
-0.9% |
9.7% |
22.3% |
-20.1% |
-3.3% |
|
1991/94 |
7.4% |
4.8% |
28.7% |
-10.8% |
-12.5% |
|
1976/94 |
5.4% |
7.8% |
27.7% |
-20.0% |
-4.8% |
|
1995/97 |
2.1% |
3.9% |
30.0% |
-12.0% |
|
Early this year, Jordan ended the
seven-year economic structural
re-adjustment program initiated back in
1992 with partial success. While the
period 1992/95 witnessed significant
achievements in the field of economic
growth and stabilization, annual growth
rates during 1996/98 fell substantially
below target (1.5% real economic growth
against a stipulated target of 6.5%).
Although the stated main objectives of
the economic re-adjustment program were to
achieve macro-economic stability and
sustained economic growth, the retreat in
economic performance during the last three
years of the program has made the picture
less vivid. However, moderately speaking,
Jordan's
average economic performance during the
whole life of the seven-year program
(1992/98) can be summed up as follows:
-
An average GDP growth rate of 5.6% p.a. in
real terms.
-
Containment of inflation within a range of
3.5% p.a.
-
Maintaining the stability of the local
currency in addition to other monetary
indicators.
-
Increase in the Central Bank's net foreign
reserves from less US$ 0.5 billion in 1995
to more than US$ 1.5 billion in 1998
covering
Jordan's imports of 4 months.
-
Significant progress in the field of
external debt (107.7% of GDP in 1993 to
94% of GDP in 1998).
The historical performance of Jordan's
macro-economic indicators during the
period 1993/98 can be exhibited as
follows:
|
|
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
|
Domestic Economy: |
In Percent |
|
GDP mkt. prices/US$ m. |
5475 |
6011 |
6504 |
6713 |
7049 |
7431 |
|
Real GDP growth |
5.7 |
8.7 |
5.7 |
1.0 |
1.3 |
2.2 |
|
Inflation |
3.3 |
3.6 |
2.3 |
6.5 |
3.0 |
4.5 |
|
Unemployment |
19.2 |
15.5 |
15 |
14 |
13.2 |
15 |
|
JD/US$ exchanges rate |
1.44 |
1.43 |
1.43 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
|
|
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
|
External Economy:
In millions of US Dollars |
|
Exports (F.O.B) |
1246 |
1425 |
1770 |
1817 |
1836 |
1800 |
|
Imports (C.I.F) |
3528 |
3372 |
3701 |
4289 |
4099 |
3834 |
|
Trade balance |
-2282 |
-1949 |
-1926 |
-2473 |
-2266 |
-2034 |
|
Current account balance |
-642 |
-398 |
-259 |
-222 |
29 |
3 |
|
Gross official reserves |
588 |
431 |
427 |
698 |
1694 |
1170 |
|
External Public Debt |
6091 |
6205 |
6364 |
6650 |
6449 |
7044 |
|
Ext. Debt Commitment |
|
914 |
918 |
942 |
824 |
775 |
|
- Principal Payments |
|
557 |
540 |
566 |
474 |
413 |
|
- Interest Payments |
|
357 |
378 |
376 |
350 |
362 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
|
Monetary Indicators:
In millions of US Dollars |
|
Money supply (M2) |
6458 |
6899 |
7265 |
7287 |
7852 |
8453 |
|
% |
6.9 |
8.0 |
6.5 |
0.3 |
7.8 |
7.6 |
|
Total assets of Banks |
9717 |
10765 |
12055 |
12490 |
13628 |
14728 |
|
% |
6.9 |
11.6 |
12 |
5.1 |
9.3 |
8.1 |
|
Total Deposits |
7118 |
7683 |
8147 |
8432 |
8994 |
9590 |
|
% |
4 |
7.9 |
6.0 |
3.4 |
6.6 |
6.6 |
|
Banks' credit facilities |
3950 |
4629 |
5218 |
5520 |
5603 |
6034 |
|
% |
23.6 |
17.1 |
12.7 |
5.7 |
1.5 |
7.7 |
|
Net Foreign Assets |
2356 |
2440 |
2611 |
2594 |
3187 |
3344 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
|
Financial Variables:
As a percent of GDP |
|
Budget balance |
-5.9 |
-6.1 |
-5.3 |
-7.8 |
-7.7 |
-10.7 |
|
Gross Investment |
37.4 |
34.4 |
33.6 |
30.7 |
26.8 |
25.7 |
|
Consumption |
93.9 |
89.7 |
88.0 |
94.6 |
96.4 |
95.6 |
|
Domestic savings |
6.1 |
10.3 |
12.0 |
5.4 |
3.6 |
4.4 |
|
Current a/c |
-11.7 |
-6.6 |
-3.9 |
-3.3 |
0.4 |
0.0 |
|
External debt |
107.7 |
101.7 |
96.6 |
109.1 |
101.4 |
94.3 |
|
Debt service/Exports |
43.9 |
29.1 |
26.4 |
25.9 |
24.1 |
21.9 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The enhanced performance of the
Jordanian economy, the lightening of its
public external debt and the improved
financial management have all earned
Jordan a fair credit rating. Standard &
Poor's sovereign rating for Jordan as of
the start of the current year was as
follows:
|
|
Short-term |
Long-term |
|
Foreign Currency |
N/A |
BB- |
|
Local Currency |
A – 3 |
BBB- |
Problems and Challenges Encountered by
Jordan:
Jordan has been encountered by some
chronic economic difficulties, to which
national authorities have been solemnly
striving to find effective remedies. The
major issues that have to be urgently
addressed in this regard can be outlines
as follows:
Despite the significant progress
achieved in the field of real economic
growth during the first half of the 1990s,
Jordan has failed to maintain reasonable
sustainable growth rates during the
subsequent years (1996/98).
Growth has been negatively affected by
the constraints on exportation initiated
by neighboring countries, the end of the
construction boom and the limited volume
of investments launched due to political
uncertainties and constraints.
Jordan has been suffering from a chronic
budget deficit for a long time. The level
of public expenditure has always surpassed
domestic revenues even after the inclusion
of financial assistance and grants.
Jordan
has been conceived, by many economists, to
live beyond its means, bringing about the
issue of inconsistency between the
country's income and aggregate spending.
Despite calls to alleviate budget
deficit through rationalizing public
expenditure and enhancing domestic
revenue, through tax reform and
improvement of collection, the deficit
continued to linger at very high levels
(7.7% of GDP in 1997 and 10.7% in 1998).
-
The Savings-Investment Gab:
Jordan has always depended on external
loans and financing to finance domestic
investments. This is so since the level of
domestic savings is not sufficient enough
to meet investments. In 1998, the Gross
Fixed Capital Formation represented 25.7%
of GDP, while domestic savings accounted
for only 4.4% GDP leaving a gab of 21.3%
of GDP.
This gab, in addition to the deficit in
the general budget, has always raised the
need for external financing and borrowing,
which has further added to the problem of
public debt.
The building up of Jordan's public debt
was initiated back in mid 1980s as a way
of compensating for the decrease in
capital inflow following the retreat in
the economies of the Gulf countries.
Towards the end of the 1980s, Jordan's
external public debt stood in the
neighborhood of 190% of GDP with a very
high debt service ratio. However, Jordan's
efforts, within the context of the
economic re-adjustment program, to
alleviate this problem have made very
limited success. The external public debt
was lowered to 94.3% of GDP in 1998 with a
debt service ration of 21.9%. This limited
improvement was the outcome of the
decrease in new borrowing, rescheduling of
repayments, debt buy back and debt swap
operations in addition to debt forgiveness
extended by several creditors.
High unemployment has been an immanent
feature of the Jordanian economy almost
throughout the different stages of
development. This feature was the result
of the high population growth rate
accomplished by a limited absorptive
capacity of the domestic economy. This
fact has always raised the need to find
more job opportunities for an increasing
number of educated workers in other
regional markets.
-
The Deficits in Trade and Payment
Balances:
Given the scarcity of natural economic
resources and its limited industrial and
productive base, Jordan has always
suffered a frequent deficit in its trade
balance. The import bill has always
constituted more than double the export
earnings.
Despite Jordan's continuous attempts to
increase exports and diversify exportation
base, success in this field remains
partial. The country's ability to export
its produce to traditional markets remains
more or less a political issue rather than
an economic one.
The deficit in trade balance is
alleviated by a sizable surplus in the
services balance due to the significance
of worker's remittances, which account for
more than 75% of the services balance
surplus.
On the other hand, the international
process of economic and market
globalization is an inevitable one that
involves almost all countries of the
world. Jordan is aware that it cannot
detain its economy outside the circle that
embodies more than 85% of the
international economies. For that purpose,
Jordan has already signed a partnership
agreement with the European Union to be
effectuated as if January 2000, and is now
engaged in the process of finalizing
negotiations for membership to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), which is
expected to take place before the end of
1999.
However, many difficulties and
challenges, already faced by Jordan, arise
from the country's attempt to integrate
its economy into the world economy through
the globalization and deregulation of its
domestic market.
The Jordanian industrial sector
is an infant one that has been raised
within an atmosphere of high custom
protection. The deregulation of external
sector through the abolition of all forms
of protection will put the Jordanian
industries in direct confrontation with
more developed economies. The fierce
competition expected to arise from this
confrontation will have severe
repercussions on local industries if they
do not adjust to become more efficient in
terms of cost and quality.
In accordance with the structural
re-adjustment programs initiated during
early 1990s, the Jordanian government
launched a privatization program aiming at
enhancing the efficiency and
competitiveness of the economy,
encouraging domestic as well as foreign
investments and giving the private sector
a larger role in economic activities.
However, due to political considerations
and the lack of consensus over the
viability of the program, efforts to
implement this program have been lax and
at minimal levels. A clear and
well-defined strategy to implement the
program was only announced during 1996.
Until now, the execution of the program
has been limited to the sale of some
government shares in selected companies
and industries. Nonetheless, the
government announced its determination to
pursue the implementation of the
privatization program and overcome
opposition to it.
These challenges and difficulties have
to be firmly and efficiently dealt with in
order to put the national economy on the
fast-growth-track. In a rapidly changing
global environment, slow economic growth
is not an affordable luxury to Jordan.
Jordan has to work hard and undertake
committed difficult and swift arrangements
in the field of structural re-adjustment,
privatization, administrative reforms and
legislative modernization.
The New Economic Re-adjustment Program
(1999/2001):
The domestic and regional political
uncertainties, combined with large fiscal
deficit and high burden of foreign debt
service have put some pressure on foreign
exchange reserves during the last months
of 1998 and early months of 1999. this in
turn triggered the need for further
economic reforms to enhance
self-dependency, consolidate previous
achievements and sustain economic growth.
The government has therefore stated its
intention to continue pursuing all efforts
to overhaul the entire economy.
A new economic re-adjustment program,
aiming at stabilizing the economy and
sitting the stage for sustained recovery
and resumption of structural reform, has
thus been initiated. The program covers
the coming three years with the following
main features and objectives:
|
|
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
|
GDP Growth/Real Terms |
2.0% |
2.5% |
3.5% |
|
Inflation Rate |
1.9% |
2.8% |
2.4% |
|
JD/US$ Exchange Rate |
1.41 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
|
Export (F.O.B. Prices) |
1.856 |
1.932 |
2.046 |
|
Import (C.I.F Prices) |
3.987 |
4.190 |
4.451 |
|
Current Account Balance |
-51 |
-139 |
-156 |
|
Gross Off. Foreign Reserves |
1.094 |
1.358 |
1.478 |
Future Prospects of the Jordanian Economy:
The most immanent factor that
characterizes the Jordanian economy is its
remarkable vulnerability to external
influences and regional transformations.
This actuality is not expected to change
in the coming near future, and will
continue to reflect on the performance of
the Jordanian economy.
Hence, the performance of the Jordanian
economy on the domestic level cannot be
looked at in separation of its performance
on the regional as well as the
international level due to the
significance of the Jordanian external
economy. From a political perspective, the
dawdling in concluding a peace treaty
between Israel on the one side and Lebanon
and Syria on the other, the remote and
unexpected lifting of economic sanctions
imposed on Iraq and the distant
normalization of trade relations between
Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian
Authority, are all major regional factors
that will significantly influence the
economic climate of Jordan. Such issues
are not expected to be resolved in the
coming near future and shall continue to
have their negative implications on the
Jordanian economy.
Internationally, the trends towards
globalization, deregulation and abolition
of all sorts of barriers between world
economies are picking up momentum. The new
features of the world economic system are
taking shape and becoming much clearer.
These trends, expected to materialize in
the longer-run, will have severe
repercussions on the Jordanian economy
after the adaptation period ends.
During the coming three years, the
Jordanian economy will be subject to a
painful process of structural reform. The
reforms to be implemented during this
period will concentrate on the fields of
privatization, taxation and introducing
the VAT, and deregulation of trade
external economy. The fruits of such a
reform will materialize in the medium and
long-term future.
While the prospects for high economic
growth in Jordan remain slim in the very
near future, the longer-term outlook is
more favorable. Even though the new
economic re-adjustment program stipulates
real GDP growth during 1999 at 2%, this
rate is now being put within the region of
0.5%-0.8% according to some estimates.
Such estimates lie primarily in the
expected continuity of the negative
regional factors already influencing the
Jordanian economy.
However, prospects for economic growth
for the year 2000 and afterwards seem to
be much brighter based on the expectations
of increased exports, mainly from the
mining and quarrying sector, and booming
tourism. Tourism, in addition to other
major services sectors, is expected to be
one of the leading growth sectors of the
economy.
The Jordanian Economy under the Regime of
King Abdullah:
The death of King Hussein marked the
end of an important era in the history of
the Jordanian economy. The change of
leadership is usually associated with the
predominance of an atmosphere of doubt and
speculation in this part of the world.
Fortunately, Jordan was an exception to
this rule as the process of succession was
remarkably smooth. However, an atmosphere
of uncertainty and doubt was manifested by
the less-than –expected performance of the
Jordanian economy during the last three
years of the economic re-adjustment
program.
Since assumed power, King Abdullah, who
inherited a heavy economic burden, high
market distortions, chronic structural
imbalances in the trade and payment
accounts, high rate of unemployment and
poverty, has spared neither time nor
effort to deal with this burden. Within
two months of the new rule, Jordan
concluded an agreement with the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund extend
the economic re-adjustment program for
another three years. The new King has
stated his eagerness and enthusiasm to
pursue economic reforms in the fields of
economic growth, unemployment,
administrative bureaucracy and corruption,
public debenture, investment climate, and
privatization.
Many investment-related laws and
legislation are now in the process of
being amended to harmonize the Jordanian
economy with the new international
standards and requirements. Moreover, in
spite of the high cost embodied into the
drive towards eliminating quantitative and
custom restrictions on trade, the
government is persistent to further
liberalize the economy and its external
sector to meet with international
requirements.
King Abdullah || started his rule by
visiting some Arab sates in an attempt to
consolidate Jordan's relations with its
neighbors and crowding support for the
Kingdom's suffering economy. The king
tried to capitalize on the high
international support for Jordan after the
tragic death of the late King Hussein. In
doing so, he concentrated on restoring
warm relations with major Arab states,
which represent potential markets for the
Jordanian agriculture and industrial
products as well as Jordanian labor. He
further called on Arab leaders to
financially back up Jordan through
providing finance to infrastructure and
encouraging Arab investments in the
country.
On the international scene, King
Abdullah visited some European countries
and the USA in an attempt to gather
international support for Jordan and the
economic re-adjustment program it
embraces. The fruits of this tour came out
in the form of an international call to
write off 50% of Jordan's debt to the
Paris Club.
Conclusion:
To talk and speculate about the
Jordanian economy under the new regime of
King Abdullah || is premature, considering
the short period of time since he has
assumed power. The greatest part of the
new King's efforts during the last six
months concentrated on the restructuring
of the internal house and the
consolidation of Jordan's external
relations with regional and international
countries.
The performance of the new King has far
surpassed expectations. Despite the short
period of the King's rule, some positive
features of the new era have already
started to evolve and materialize. The
economy has been given an absolute
priority over any other issues. The
process of political and economic reform
is picking momentum. Furthermore, Jordan's
international relationships are now being
re-arranged on the basis of economic
considerations and benefits.