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The Jordanian Economy
Revival Amid Regional Uncertainty
By:
Mufleh M. Akel
Executive Regional Manager
Jordan and Palestine Credit Division
Arab Bank – General Management
April, 2003
The Jordanian Economy
Revival Amid Regional Uncertainty
Introduction:
The birth of the third millennium marked
the inception of a series of major world
political and military events. The
September 11th attacks,
followed by the US-led military expedition
on Afghanistan and the subsequent
Anglo-American war on Iraq, which broke
out in mid March and still underway, have
all had serious repercussions on the world
economic order in general, and the Middle
Eastern region in particular. The
intensity of these successive events has
led to a remarkable deterioration in the
international as well as the regional
economic situation and prospects.
Within this context, the recorded growth
in world economic output slipped from 4.7%
in year 2000 to 2.2% in year 2001.
Simultaneously, economic growth in the
Middle Eastern region fell back from 5.7%
in year 2000 to 4.2% in year 2001 and
further to an estimate of 2.2% in 2002.
Jordan
was no exception to these globally
overwhelming developments. Official data
showed that economic growth during the
fourth quarter of 2001 relapsed to around
3.1% from an average of 4.6% recorded
during the first three quarters of the
year.
However, the success with which Jordan has
been able to weather the negative impacts
and repercussions of the above mentioned
world events, while continue to achieve
comparatively high economic growth rates
is an issue that is worth of being praised
and evaluated. The core purpose of this
article is to shed enough light on
Jordan’s economic performance during 2002
and prospects of growth in 2003.
Overview of the Jordanian Economy:
Jordan is a country of 5.3 million
inhabitants comprising a well dedicated
and highly skilled labor force of around
1.45 million. The economy suffers from
limited financial and natural resources,
and is dominated by trade and
services-related activities, which account
for approximately two thirds of the GDP.
Due to its relatively small size, openness
and geopolitical positioning within the
center of regional transformations, the
Jordanian economy is rather fragile and
highly vulnerable to exogenous factors and
shocks.
Economic performance has thus been
relatively volatile during the past
decade, manifested partially by Jordan’s
heavy reliance on trade with high-income
oil exporting countries as well as capital
inflows from abroad in the form of foreign
aid, financial grants and workers’
remittances. Jordan’s industrial base is
moderately thin, whereas its natural
resources, mainly potash, phosphate and
limestone do account for a sizeable stake
of its national exports. Labor
remittances and financial assistance from
Arab as well as foreign countries have,
over the years, influenced the country’s
income levels and economic activity.
The slowdown in the economies of major
Gulf States
in the aftermath of the acute drop in oil
prices during the mid 1980s has had severe
repercussions on the Jordanian economy.
The domestic economy underwent a critical
fall in the flow of workers’ remittances,
external financial assistance as well as
the volume of trade routed to these
economies. In line with these
developments, the recorded economic growth
slipped to 2% in nominal terms, deficits
in the current account, payments balance
and general budget also widened, and net
foreign currency reserves fell to
extremely worrying levels. This financial
crisis eventually led to the devaluation
of the domestic currency by around 45% in
the late 1980s.
Since then, Jordan has been vigorously
engaged in carrying out an IMF-guided
economic re-adjustment program, with the
aim of restoring fiscal and monetary
stability and reforming structural
imbalances within its domestic economy.
The first program, initiated back in 1989,
was disrupted by the second Gulf war that
broke out in 1990/91 and the subsequent
imposition of strict economic sanctions on
Iraq – Jordan’s primary trade partner.
The heavy economic and financial burden
brought about by these changes, ranging
from a sharp drop in workers’ remittances
to the suspension of foreign assistance
together with an excessive pressure on the
country’s limited resources and public
utilities emanating from the huge influx
of Jordanian returnees following the war,
had been alleviated by the vast amounts of
financial funds injected into the economy
by those returnees, an act that initiated
a construction-led boom in Jordan.
Subsequently, the economic restructuring
program was revised to cover the period
1992/98, which together with the economic
expansion fueled by the Jordanian
returnees’ attempts to initiate new
businesses, caused
GDP
to grow by 16.1% in 1992. In early 1999,
Jordan ended the program with partial
success. While the stabilization
policies, incorporated into the program,
were very successful in restoring the
stability of major monetary indicators,
the structural re-adjustment policies were
less successful in introducing needed
reforms in the fields of economic
liberalization, taxation, world
integration and privatization.
Additionally, the contractionary nature of
the program, the widespread state of
uncertainty and regional political
tension, together with the weakening of
traditional export markets have all
contributed to a slowdown in economic
performance. While macro-economic
indicators showed a fair improvement (real
economic growth averaged 5.6% p.a. and
inflation ranged around 3.5%),
micro-economic indicators reflected a
widening and deepening recession.
Moreover, encountered by serious
difficulties to join the WTO and integrate
within the world new economic order,
Jordan resolved eventually to pursue
further economic re-adjustment, and
managed to extend the program, with the
help of the IMF and World Bank, for an
additional three years ending in year
2002.
Averagely speaking, Jordan’s economic
performance during the second half of the
1990s discloses less-than-expected success
in achieving growth targets. Average GDP
growth lingered around 3% p.a. in real
terms. However, on the brighter side,
annual
CPI
inflation remained below 3%, and stability
of the Jordanian Dinar and other major
monetary indicators had been enhanced.
Also, net foreign exchange reserves showed
significant increase from US$ 0.7 billion
in 1996 to US$ 2.8 billion in 2000
covering an eight-month imports bill.
Jordan’s external public debt, in turn,
has notably improved, with its outstanding
balance slipping from 95% of
GDP in 1996 to 80% in year 2000.
On the other hand, the regional
turbulence, originating from the political
impasse on the Palestinian front and the
continued economic embargo imposed on Iraq
have been mitigated by the warm and
friendly relations with Arab neighbors and
the support from many other foreign
countries. Jordan’s internal stability
has been reinforced by the popularity of
the monarch, who has been keenly and
persistently pushing towards further
political and economic reform, in addition
to improving relations with other Arab
states.
Economic Performance During the Period
2001/02:
Prior to the September 11th
incident in the USA, the Jordanian economy
seemed to be on track. Signs of economic
recovery had already been surfacing,
wherein real economic growth climbed from
3.1% in 1999 to 4.2% in year 2000.
Similarly, GDP in real terms grew by 4.2%
during year 2001 despite the worldwide
economic slowdown and the negative spill
outs of the September 11th
attacks. Yet, it is worth noting that
growth during the fourth quarter of 2001
descended to around 3.1% from an average
of 4.6% evidenced during the first three
quarters of the year.
The September 11th events have
had an adverse effect on so many sectors
of the Jordanian economy. Tourism in
Jordan has been the mostly impacted sector
as denoted by the major drop in the number
of incoming tourists, especially those
western tourists with high spending
capabilities, and the consequent fall in
hotel rooms occupancy rates and total
tourism revenues. The increase in the
number of Arab tourists, mostly transit
visitors, has failed to compensate for the
decline in the number of western
tourists. Additionally, the slowdown in
tourism activities has negatively impacted
the civil aviation industry in Jordan. On
the other hand, the inflow of foreign
investment has been interrupted by the
growing tension on the international
arena. This, in fact, has been associated
with a noticeable deceleration in the pace
at which the privatization program is
being implemented.
Nonetheless, the overall performance of
the Jordanian economy has been
satisfactory in light of the many
challenges and difficulties encountered.
The following table illustrates the
progress in macro-economic indicators over
the past few years:
US$ Million
|
|
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
|
GDP
/ Nominal prices |
7910 |
8131 |
8463 |
8827 |
9293 |
|
GDP
Growth / Real terms |
3.0% |
3.1% |
4.2% |
4.2% |
4.9% |
|
CPI
Inflation |
3.1% |
0.6% |
0.7% |
1.8% |
1.8% |
|
Per capita income / US $ |
1663 |
1659 |
1679 |
1704 |
1745 |
|
JD/US$ Exchange rate |
1.41 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
1.41 |
|
Exports |
1802 |
1831 |
1899 |
2294 |
2743 |
|
Imports |
3824 |
3698 |
4576 |
4833 |
4962 |
|
Trade Deficit /
GDP |
-25.6% |
-23.0% |
-31.6% |
-28.8% |
-23.9% |
|
Current Account /
GDP |
0.3% |
5.0% |
0.7% |
0.6% |
4.4% |
|
Net Foreign Reserves |
1170 |
1991 |
2763 |
2578 |
3495 |
|
Imports Coverage (Months) |
4.0 |
7.1 |
7.9 |
7.0 |
9.6 |
|
Fiscal Deficit /
GDP |
6.3% |
3.9% |
3.4% |
3.6% |
3.9% |
|
Domestic Pub. Debt /
GDP |
15.2% |
15.7% |
15.7% |
18.4% |
20.3% |
|
External Pub. Debt /
GDP |
89% |
90% |
80% |
76% |
76% |
Source: Ministry of Finance,
Government Finance Bulletin, March 2003.
Central Bank of Jordan,
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, March 2003.
Reasonably good economic results and
achievements continued through year 2002.
Preliminary estimates indicate that the
Jordanian economy has been able to grow by
4.9% in real terms during year 2002, while
maintaining CPI inflation within an
acceptable level of 1.8%. This economic
growth rate surpassed growth rates arrived
at by many other countries of the region;
i.e., Syria 3.9%, Tunisia 3.8%, Bahrain
4.1%, Egypt 2%, Lebanon 1.5%, Oman 3.3%,
Qatar 3% and Saudi Arabia 0.7%.
Having Gross Domestic Product grew at 4.9%
in real terms, while population grew at
2.8% last year, living standards in Jordan
have been better off and per capita income
has shown a fair improvement over year
2002.
Jordan has successfully managed to narrow
down its trade deficit by 13.2% in 2002 in
light of the significant increase of 19.6%
in total exports versus a minor increase
of 2.3% in the volume of imports. A
substantial part of the increase in
national exports could be attributed to
the vast deployment of Qualifying
Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Jordan, through
which domestic industries can export quota
and custom free to the US market. Within
this context, the Jordanian exports to the
USA continued to grow from US$ 7 million
in 1997 to around US$ 408 million in
2002. The surge in national exports has
positively reflected on the performance of
the industrial sector, whose production
index rose by 10.6% in 2002.
The diminishing trade deficit, accompanied
by a sizeable increase in the inflow of
workers’ remittances and foreign
assistance have all contributed to an
improvement in the current account status,
which exhibited a surplus of around US$
405 million in year 2002. Jordan has also
succeeded in building up convenient and
comfortable reserves of foreign
currencies, the net of which recorded an
unprecedented level of US$ 3.5 billion
covering around 9 months of the imports
bill.
Despite regional and domestic
difficulties, banks in Jordan have been
successfully able to provide an efficient
mechanism for facilitating the pooling of
domestic savings, attracting foreign
investment and directing it to the most
efficient, productive and profitable
projects. Within this context, total
banking deposits rose by 7.5% to reach an
equivalent US$ 13.2 billion by the end of
2002, whereas banking credit showed an
increase of 3.7% to reach an equivalent of
US$ 7.2 billion. The Jordanian banking
sector stands to be one of the most
sophisticated and highly regulated sectors
of the economy, if not the whole region.
In the field of global integration and
enhancing access to international markets,
Jordan’s success in joining the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has been further
supplemented and firmed up by its
successful negotiation of a Free Trade
Agreement with the USA rendering Jordan
the fourth country, after Canada, Mexico
and Israel, to entertain a privileged
status for its industrial and services
sectors in freely accessing the US
market. In parallel, Aqaba has been
announced a Special Economic Zone,
providing generous exemptions and
incentives for all sorts of enterprises,
with the hope of transforming Jordan’s
only port on the Red Sea into a regional
hub that is capable of hosting foreign as
well as domestic industrial and services
investments.
Alternatively, Jordan’s efforts to achieve
other preset economic targets have rather
fallen short of the stipulated levels.
The fiscal deficit has a little bit
widened due to a planned relaxation of the
fiscal policy and the resultant increase
in public expenditures. In addition, the
outstanding external public debt increased
by US$ 540 million during 2002 – an 8%
increase over 2001 figure – which can
partially be attributed to a decrease in
the value of the Jordanian Dinar against
other foreign currencies. Moreover,
despite the continued fall in the
officially announced unemployment rate
from about 20% in the early 1990s to 14.7%
in year 2001, other official estimates put
the current unemployment figure in the
region of 17 – 20%. On the other hand,
Jordan has not been able to proceed with
its privatization program at the desired
pace. This could be blamed on the
continued deterioration in the regional
and global economic and political
conditions and the dominance of an
unfavorable investment climate.
Yet, in light of the overall positive
performance of the Jordanian economy under
the past structural re-adjustment program
that ended in April 2002, the government
has been able to conclude an agreement
with the IMF to extend the expired program
for an additional period of two years
(2002/04). This extension has allowed
Jordan to reschedule US$ 1.2 billion in
debts that are due to Paris Club over the
period 2002/07, an act the is believed to
alleviate mounting pressure on Jordan’s
public budget and payments balance.
As such, Jordan has been able to maintain
its credit rating by Standard & Poor’s,
however with a downgrading of its foreign
currency outlook from “Positive” to
“stable”. This downgrading was meant to
reflect the continued regional tension and
conflict, which might obstruct and cause a
delay in the implementation of the
economic re-adjustment program.
Prospects for Year 2003:
To discuss and speculate the future state
of the Jordanian economy in the aftermath
of the US-Iraqi war is quite premature in
light of the continued military actions
against Iraq, bearing in mind the strong
economic relationships that tie together
Iraq and Jordan. Both countries are
commercially connected via a US$ 400
million – trade protocol that renders Iraq
as Jordan’s main trading partner. The
Iraqi market has always ranked first for
major exporting industries in Jordan,
while Iraq has been the sole provider of
crude oil and related derivatives for
Jordan, half of which comes at no cost
while the other half is preferentially
priced.
Prior to the Anglo-American war against
Iraq that broke out in mid March,
prospects of economic growth in Jordan had
seemed more favorable with GDP growth rate
anticipated at around 5% in real terms,
while
CPI
inflation forecasted within the region of
2.5 – 3.0%. National exports and imports
have initially been planned ahead at 15%
and 5% in respective terms.
However, the impact on the Jordanian
economy of the regional political
turbulence and the going on war in Iraq
could already be felt in many ways.
Jordan’s industrial exports to Iraq have
already been brought to a halt. The flow
of Iraqi crude oil into the kingdom has
been disrupted. At the same time, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and the United Emirates
undertook to provide Jordan with oil at no
cost for the coming three months. This
will provide a temporary relief for
Jordan, after which the country will have
to pay for its annual 50-million barrel
imports bill. Even though the price at
which Jordan is supposed to pay against
its oil imports is not yet known, it will
most certainly have a negative impact on
the kingdom’s Balance of Payments.
Tourism, on the other hand, has been
severely hit with a significant fall in
the number of tourists, hotel rooms’
occupancy rates and the total volume of
tourism income. This has been accompanied
by a slowdown in the activities of the
domestic aviation industry, whereby the
Royal Jordanian – Jordan’s national air
carrier – has undergone a drop in the
number of passengers, while bearing the
extra costs associated with the increase
in both the insurance premiums and the
length of some route lines.
Other negative spill outs are expected to
materialize and become more visible over
the weeks and months to come. The
termination of military actions against
Iraq will bring an end to the economic
sanctions long imposed on Iraq, which in
turn will partially end Jordan’s trading
intermediary role between Iraq and the
rest of the world. Besides, the Jordanian
industries are expected to lose part of
their privileged exporting status,
extended via the trade protocol, which in
itself is expected to be called off, as
competition within the Iraqi market heats
up with other industries from neighboring
as well as foreign countries. This should
not be comprehended as a discontinuation
of Jordan’s trade existence within the
Iraqi trade market. Rather, the Jordanian
products will have to compete on equal
footing with other products from various
origins. Hence, “competition” and
“competitive advantage” would be the title
of the forthcoming period in connection
with the Jordanian industries’ ability to
export to the Iraqi market.
Also, with the expected operation of the
Iraqi Um Qaser port and the possible use
of other neighboring ports in Kuwait,
Syria and Turkey, the Aqaba port is
expected to lose a major part of the trade
passed on to Iraq. This, in addition to
the disruption of the inflow of Iraqi oil,
would entail severe adverse effects on
Jordan’s land transport sector. To
illustrate, the cessation of the daily
transport of around 125 thousand barrels
of crude oil from Iraq to Jordan and the
fall in the volume of commodities passing
through Jordan to Iraq, estimated at
around 650 thousand tons per annum,
signifies a serious threat to more than 13
thousand Jordanian trailer trucks and
tanks in addition to the interrelated
domestic vehicle service sector.
On the other hand, the possible movement
of some Iraqi nationals residing in
Jordan, estimated at approximately 300
thousand Iraqis comprising a large number
of businessmen and investors, to Iraq for
permanent settlement after restoring peace
and stability is expected to negatively
impact the Jordanian economy in many
ways. This is so as this movement is
expected to involve a portion of the
banking deposits, credit facilities and
investments belonging to those Iraqis.
Yet, economic growth prospects and outlook
for year 2003 seem on the positive side
although less brighter than in 2002. The
Qualifying Industrial Zones are expected
to take a major role in further boosting
Jordan’s exports to the US market. The
inflow of foreign aid, assistance and
workers’ remittances is believed to
support Jordan’s current account and
overall economic performance. Value added
within the agricultural sector is
anticipated to grow positively with a more
than average rainy season. On a regional
level, the forthcoming reconstruction
operations in Iraq, in the aftermath of
the war, is expected to carry some
benefits to selected sectors of the
Jordanian economy; i.e., IT sector,
engineering companies, local contractors
and banks. Tourism activities, on the
other hand, are expected to gradually pick
up more momentum with the restoration of
peace and stability in the area. It is
worth mentioning here that long-term
political stability remains key to
sustainable economic development and
growth.
Conclusion:
The Jordanian economy has been able to
perform exceptionally well during year
2002. GDP grew by 4.9% in real terms,
which outstripped growth rates realized by
other countries of the region. Jordan has
been successfully able to withstand the
negative repercussions of the September 11th
events thanks to many factors. A surge in
domestic demand, fueled by expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies, an increase
in capital inflows, in the form of
workers’ remittances and foreign
assistance, and a boost in national
exports, which can be attributed to the
significant expansion in QIZs’ activities
directed to the US market, were all the
main engines of growth during the past
couple of years.
Credit should also be given to the prudent
management of the Jordanian economy as
well as the personal initiatives of H.M.
King Abdulla II, who spares no effort or
time in regionally and internationally
marketing Jordan as a potential investment
hub. In this regard, H.M. King Abdulla
has participated in the first
international videoconference via
satellite that took place a few months ago
for the purpose of marketing Aqaba and
Jordan as a free commercial center capable
of attracting domestic and foreign
investments alike.
Nevertheless, Jordan’s ability to cope
with regional and international
transformations with utmost flexibility
should not be overlooked or
underestimated. Jordan has been able to
weather the recent global and regional
economic slowdown, and still realize high
real GDP growth rate that surpassed rates
achieved by many other countries of the
region. This achievement was the direct
outcome of a long and tedious process of
economic structural reform that targeted
almost all aspects of financial,
investment and legislative environment,
and meant to enhance the business climate
and attractiveness of the domestic economy
to foreign as well local investors. Time
has come to reap the benefits of
structural reforms introduced.
References:
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Central Bank of Jordan, “Monthly
Statistical Bulletin”, March 2003.
¤
Central Bank of Jordan, “Annual Report
2001”, April 2002.
¤
Department of Statistics, “Statistical
Yearbook”, Several issues.
¤
International Monetary Fund, “World
Economic Outlook”, September 2002 & April
2003 issues.
¤
Ministry of Finance, “Government Finance
Bulletin”, March 2003.
¤
Moody’s Web Site, “Moody’s Investors
Services: Country Ratings”, 2002.
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